Islam's Rise in the Turkish Republic
An analysis of Turkish political trends leading to the rise of the Refah Partisi
 

    When the subject of an Islamic revival in politics is brought up, very rarely does one think of the Turkish Republic. However, in recent history Turkish politics has been subject to vast changes in its make-up. Since the 1980 military intervention, and perhaps even earlier, the subject of religious revivalism has been in the forefront of the Kemalist republic. While many countries in the Middle East have witnessed religious upheaval in recent past, it seemed that Turkeys history and structure protected it from the same course of events. However, recent elections and trends in Turkish politics provide a different picture of the status of one of the worlds strongest secular governments.

    To understand the structure of the modern Turkish government, one must study the period immediately following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Mustafa Kamel, the father of modern Turkey. The nationalist trend that swept Turkey after the Ottoman defeat in World War I carried the country from a state of hereditary religious oligarchy to a functioning secular republic. This process was championed by the charismatic and widely popular figure later to be known as Atatürk. His rise to power would bring about a new phase of Turkish history and create a new country on the ashes of an empire. Atatürks popularity was twofold, as a hero in the defense of Anatolia from foreign intervention he would gain support among the Turkish masses, while his westernizing trends and move away from religious politics would gain him support from outside the Middle East, especially from the Western powers.

    Atatürks Republican Peoples Party (RPP) would create the new Turkish government based on the ideals of its leader. Kamels moves towards westernization would include many points, the strongest of which were: The 1924 abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, the mass closings of Islamic schools, and a new constitution based on quadrennial elections and the concept of universal male suffrage. In 1925 the Islamic calendar would be eliminated from use with the adoption of the Gregorian date system. This was coupled with the outlawing of the fez and turban to be replaced with a more western style of headwear. The Swiss civil code and the Italian criminal code were adopted a year later. In 1928 the constitutional clause calling Islam the state religion would be eliminated, and the Arabic alphabet was replaced by a Latinized Turkish alphabet created by Kamel himself. The legal adoption of family names was promoted in 1934, when Kamel officially took the name Atatürk, the father of Turks. Finally in 1936 the RPPs "Six Arrows", or ideological tenets, of republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, revolutionism, and étatism would be officially drafted into the Turkish constitution.

    With these reforms Turkey as a nation would emerge as the bridge between Europe and the Middle East, yet as an individual, belonging to neither. Atatürk, with his striking blue-eyed visage, would become the "father" of the new nation and shape both public and political life to his interpretation of a secularized society. He went so far as to declare that the religious ulema was a backward force and began to strip religion of its power by seizing control of all education, closing the Islamic shariah courts, disbanding religious organizations and brotherhoods, and bringing all religious functionaries into the fold of government employees. Atatürks discouragement of religious practice carried such authority that along with the changing of the official day of rest from Friday to Sunday, many of his political colleagues changed their own religious behavior to match.

    The republics political power was centered in the Grand National Assembly, with the Republican Peoples Party as its driving force, and Atatürk serving as both the party leader and the nations president. The system was inherently a single party system except for a brief flirtation with the Free Party in 1930, which was disbanded three months after its inception as the official opposition party. The creation and deletion of the Free Party was approved by Atatürk, but the experiment was stopped when it became apparent that the Free Party was becoming a vehicle for all who opposed the republic, including religious fundamentalists.¹ From here, Atatürk took to the creation of "independent deputies," non-members of the RPP, whose job it was to criticize the government vigorously in public and to expand the theory of "loyal opposition." This was paired with the creation of halkevleri, or peoples houses, which were to serve as models of self-administration and institutions for both general education and political indoctrination.

    The period of the 1930s saw the expansion of economic and social development, including state education, transportation systems, and expansion in the fields of communication and industrialization as much as possible with Turkeys limited resources. This was also the time when the fledgling nation would face its hardest test, the death of Atatürk in 1938. It was from this point forward that changes in Turkish politics would lead to their shape today. These reforms began under Ismet Inönü, Atatürks successor, in 1946. Calls for the relaxation of political party restrictions led to the government allowing four prominent RPP members to split off and form the Democrat Party (DP). The Democrats won a small number of seats in the elections of 1946, yet it was not until 1950 that the nation would be shocked by the massive victory of the party and the quiet transfer of power from the RPP, thus ending the Kemalist period of Turkish Politics.

    The decade that followed saw important changes in Turkish government practice, especially with regard to religion. The RPP government had allowed religious education in state schools, if requested by the parents. The DP announced that now it would be provided for all students, unless parents requested their children exempt. Government funding for mosques increased and the general political discouragement of religious practice was eased. The economy was the second focus of DP reform. Encouragement of private enterprise was increased and large-scale aid from the United States began under the Truman Doctrine. The government began deficit financing after a surge in grain prices following the Korean War, which resulted in a period of rapid inflation, coupled with increased urbanization. However, the popularity of the DP continued into the 1954 and 1957 elections, allowing it to retain its political power.

    The period beginning with 1959 would usher in the next wave of reform in Turkish politics. When the economy became unstable Turkeys creditors called on the World Bank to normalize the situation, and opposition from the RPP became stronger. In May of 1960 the Turkey faced its first military intervention as the army ousted the DP regime. The corps of military officers comprising the following National Unity Committee began to reform constitutional and electoral law based on the principles of Atatürk. A new constitution was drafted which called for the addition of a Senate, a constitutional court, and a new electoral system based on the idea of proportional representation. With this in place the military withdrew from politics and the republic returned to order. The RPP returned to power at the head of a coalition government, only to be defeated in 1965 when the Justice Party (JP), the successor of the DP, won a clear victory in elections. Carrying several of the same policies in economic and social issues as the DP, the Justice Party was able to continue its election triumphs in 1969.

    However, in 1968 Necmettin Erbekan would split away from Suleiman Demirels Justice Party and form the Islamic National Order Party. At the same time another group of JP ministers would form the neo-fascist National Action Party in the same year. Opposition between the JP, the RPP and other factions would lead to years of political stagnation and economic problems. Once again, in 1971, the military would step in with its "coup by memorandum," a warning to Demirels government which resulted primarily in the resignation of Demirel and the banning of the National Order Party. The RPP would return to power in 1973 in a coalition with Erbekans newly reformed National Salvation Party (NSP), and under the leadership of the RPPs new Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit.

    Instability and violence in Turkish politics marred the period following the RPPs new rise to power. In 1974 Turkey invaded northern Cyprus and the United States cut off aid to the country. Both the NAP and NSP were busy forming alliances with associated youth groups and trade unions, which shared their respective ideologies. The two parties also became active in establishing branch ties to Turkish workers in Europe thereby absorbing incoming capital away from the government into their own parties. By the 1977 elections the Justice Party was able to form coalitions with both NAP and the NSP to keep a precarious hold on power. Along with these actions there was a strong pull in the RPP ranks toward the radical left which led to strong political fracturing on all sides and a paralysis of government. No two parties could work together, no economic or social problems were addressed by the government, the inability of the assembly to even be able to elect a president for the republic, and an outbreak of urban guerrilla violence grew between radicals on the right and left.

    The economys deterioration persisted. World oil prices continued to drop, sparking a global recession. The Demirel government was accused of careless spending, and the Turkish foreign debt rose so high that foreign markets began to refuse checks in Turkish Lira, shortages became commonplace, and the government resorted to a desperate mass printing of money, thereby forcing inflation higher.² With the Turkish economy near collapse, the military once again intervened in September 1980. In a move welcomed by virtually the entire country control of the government was placed in the hands of General Kenan Evren and his National Security Council, who immediately began to try to repair the Turkish democracy.

    The following "sanitization" of Turkish politics resulted in the dissolution of all political parties and the encouragement of new political actors with no connection to pre-1980 politics. However, the resulting parties were all recreations of pre-existing organizations, The Motherland Party (ANAP) emerged, Justice changed its platform to that of the True Path Party, and the NSP changed to the Refah, or Welfare, Party. Each party was under the leadership of a new leader as most of the pre-1980 politicians had been banned from activity. A new constitution was drafted vesting more power in the president, rather than the Assembly. The Senate was abolished, and Kenan was elected to a seven-year term as president.

    The 1983 elections led to the rise of ANAP as the dominant party for several reasons. ANAP was seen as the most likely party to restore civilian rule because of its leader, Turgut Özals, disengagement from military tutelage. ANAPs platform also included a strong economic position based on the export of manufactured goods in highly competitive world markets, following closely on the 1980 IMF economic restructuring plan, and the restoration of US aid in the wake of the Iranian revolution. Public strength was vested in ANAP because of its own composition which brought together a variety of religious, nationalist, and regional groups providing wide mass appeal, and due to the weakness of the opposition parties.³

    The success of the Motherland Party continued in the 1987 general elections where it secured 36.3% of the public vote. The Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) earned 24.8, and the True Path 19.8%. Neither Welfare nor the National Endeavor party secured the ten percent needed constitutionally to obtain any parliamentary seats. ANAPs Özal was elected president. However, in the 1989 municipal elections ANAPs support dropped to 21.7%, significantly lower than either of its two rivals. Throughout the following years ANAP followed policies with economic decisions based on the opinions of its ministers, rather than a normal bureaucratic process. Important provisions for particular business enterprises, such as export subsidies or subsidy credit, were awarded to party supporters while at the same time punishing those businesses who had favored rival parties.

    These changes and processes are the foundation of current Turkish politics . However, a new undercurrent has emerged in Turkey following the 1991 elections. To the surprise of many the economic policies of ANAP seemed to have a detrimental effect in the new elections as the True Path party rose to power in the new parliament and Suleiman Demirel re-emerged as Turkeys president, in 1994, Tansu Çiller was selected as Prime Minister, the first woman to hold the office. The real shock, though, was the return of Necmettin Erbekan and his Refah party as they were elected to 5% of the seats in the Grand National Assembly. They were also able to score several municipal posts, including the mayoral posts in both Istanbul and the capital Ankara.

    The return of a religious party was a shock to many both in and outside Turkish politics. Although holding a minority position in government the election of Refah ministers was a signal of the re-emergence of religion in politics in the secular republic. This trend continued recently in the 1995 elections as ANAP and True Path each scored below 20% of the seats in parliament and Refah shocked the world in securing a decisive 21.3% of the Grand National Assembly. With no party holding a majority, the idea of an Islamist led coalition in Turkey became a reality. While ANAPs Mesut Yilmaz and True Paths Çiller eventually negotiated a coalition to block Erbekan from the position of Prime Minister, recent corruption charges against Çiller and animosity between the two ruling parties may threaten this alliance in the future. If Çiller is unable to hold office in 1996, the coalition will most likely collapse and new elections will have to be called, with the very real possibility of Refah gaining a more powerful victory at the polls.

    There are several reasons that may explain the recent revival of religion in politics in Turkey. Among the first explanations is the question of recent Turkish history. Turkeys population is 99 percent Muslim, and understandably would support an Islamist led government. However, the course of both Atatürks reforms and the tradition of Kemalism since his death have effectively blocked religious participation in government. Religion has been under state control since the inception of the republic. The organization of Islam is under the control of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is appointed by the Council of Ministers after being nominated by the Prime Minister. The teachers, textbooks, and curricula of all religious schooling are under the direct supervision of the Director-General of Religious Education, a separate office of the Ministry of Education. Thus, as civil servants the personnel in charge of religious affairs and education are under the control of the state.⁴

    The 1982 constitution was also designed to suppress religion in public affairs. Three articles in the constitution, and several in the Criminal Code forbid the use of religion for political purposes or for private gain. The Progressive Republican Party of 1924, the Free Republican Party of 1930, the Nation Party in 1954, The National Order Party in 1972, and the National Salvation Party of 1980 have all been outlawed for violations of these laws. Therefore, after allowing of the Refah Partisi to exist, it could be considered natural that repressed religious influence would emerge in the form of support for the party. Arguments that Turkey may be suffering an "Iran Syndrome," however, may be unfounded as support for the religious party has been marginalized and not widespread in the country.

    The Platform of the Refah Party may also be inclusive as to its success in the polls. The ruling True Path party was built upon a decision to concentrate on the modernization of the Turkish economy in order to make a customs union with the European Union possible, and full support of an all-out military crackdown against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in southeast Turkey. While Çillers government made marginal progress on both counts, neither situation was resolved fully. The economic crisis of 1994 saw a collapse of living standards as Turkish incomes failed to keep pace with the 134 percent rate of inflation. The inflation rate improved into 1995 dropping to 90 percent but still has resulted in severe economic hardship in the lower classes. Refah has named itself the defender of laborers, artisans, and small tradesman threatened by unemployment and high interest rates "contrary to Islam."

    Although in 1985, members of the Turkish press believed that Refah would play a significant role in the future of Turkish politics one explanation for its low electoral support before 1995 can be explained by competition between Islamic factions. Along with the creation of Refah, survivors of the National Salvation Party also aligned themselves with the new Motherland Party after the former was outlawed. The strength of the Islamist element in ANAP has been apparent, especially in both the vice-president of the party, Mehmet Keçeciler, and in the NSP cliques control of the Ministry of Education in the late 1980s, and early 1990s. The religious element within the ANAP is from the Nakshibendi order, which is widespread within Turkey. ANAPs Minister of Education, Vehbi Dinçerler, was a member. This element in the government was able to promote several controversial decisions onto the Turkish public. Among these decisions was the ban on the teaching of Darwins theory in both primary and secondary schools. These were followed by actions such as a ban on beer advertisements on national radio and television, and a law in 1984 which forbade the opening of bars within 200 meters of schools, student dormitories, sports clubs, or mosques. Arabic was added to school curricula, and basic religious instruction was expanded to include teachings of the namaz, or daily prayers. Textbooks were rewritten to censor "modern" Turkish words, and add a "national" history and geography with particular attention paid to political and military figures of the early Republican period who were known for their religious opposition to the Kemalist regime, as well as the introduction of Muslim philosophy to the texts.⁵

    While the Nakshibendi order continued its campaign of religious revivalism, including the construction of mosques in both the Grand National Assembly and several state universities, the Refah party was building its platform and strength from other areas of society. The 1987 referendum removing the ban on pre-1980 political figures allowed Necmettin Erbekan to return to control of the party and rally the support of the Nurcu sect of Muslims. Erbekan, known as "Hoca" (master), speaks German and English, and is a veteran politician with 27 years of experience in politics. Upon his return to the party his style of leadership and drive were restored to the organization and a new party mission was based on his own ideology. Erbekan dislikes that his country should be the only secular parliamentary democratic system in the Muslim world, or that it has been anchored to the West for seven decades.⁶ The platform Erbekan derived leading into the December elections was based on his desires to maintaining democracy, while stripping the Turkish constitution of its secular character. The party seeks to realign Turkey towards the Islamic world and turn its back on the West, which, according to Erbekan, is reducing the country to "slavery."

    The message of Turkeys philosophical orientation was a principle concern in the 1995 elections. Erbekan described the European Union as a "club of Christians," and attacked Prime Minister Çillers steadfast efforts to enter into a trade union with the EU. Instead, he favored an "Islamic Union from Kazakhstan to Morocco."⁷ The elections themselves were described by Erbekan as "the last tango" of the imitators of the West and went further to describe his new Turkey as the liberator of Bosnia, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, and Jerusalem. However, reaction to both Erbekan and the Refah victory at the polls was answered in Turkey by a ten percent drop in the Istanbul stock exchange index and warnings from brokers that if Demirel designated Erbekan to form a new government the exchange would drop further. "Only the announcement of creation of a coalition between the two center-right parties [ANAP and True Path]... could check the fall," was the official word from the Anatolia News Agency reports.

    A variety of explanations can be used to give meaning to the recent rise of religion in both Turkey and the Middle East at large. Many orientalists, among them Bernard Lewis, tend to see this reaction as an inherent part of Islam. Islam is a not only a spiritual religion but also assigns political duties to its followers. Therefore there should be little surprise that Muslims, when given the chance, would draw on their theology rather than secular philosophy or science to guide their political actions. Another popular explanation has been the connection between deteriorating social and economic conditions in the Middle East and the rise of Islamic politics and militancy. Accordingly, Islam became the political ideology of the poor, alienated, and deprived. Some politicians see the disturbing impact of Islam on the political situation in the Middle East to be the natural outcome of the conflict between modernity and tradition. In this case the West is accused of the increased speed on modernization in the region, which in turn precipitated a political and social reaction led by the traditional forces in society. Finally, R. Hrair Dekmejian points to the concept of a multifaceted crisis, that whenever in the past Muslims faced a multiple crisis which had political, social, economic, and/or cultural dimensions they reacted by adhering closer to Islam. Some explanations for this situation could be a lack of legitimate political leadership, the collapse of the old social order without the emergence of a viable replacement, increasing economic dependency on the West, and cultural penetration by others. A return to the Islamic past, therefore, became necessary to regain their balance and recover from the deterioration in society.⁸

    While "the 1982 constitution aimed to guarantee the depoliticization of Turkish society and consolidate it around a new moral order with strong religious connotations; to enclose it, so to speak, within the magic triangle of family, mosque, and barracks,"⁹ the military leaders during the intervention probably did not foresee the rise of Refah and Islamic politics. While the development of a "parallel Islam" had gained widespread acceptance since the 1950s, not enough account was taken of the vitality of "civil society" which had been reformed due to migrations in and out of the country; previously unheard of forms of Islamic doctrine moved into new institutions, most notably by way of the Sufi brotherhoods. Thus, Refah was able to emerge with its "official, renovated, scientistic, republican Islam," and could greatly benefit from the return of religious education in both primary and secondary state schools. The partys alliance with the Nurcu sects allowed it, also, to develop the claims of "genuine secularism," complete freedom of thought and religion without state control of the citizens, an idea very different from Kemalist doctrine.¹⁰

    Turkey now emerges into a period of reformed political assignations and the possibility of increased hardships for both the government and the population. Recent political trends may signal the end of the Kemalist dream of a strictly secular Turkey, and the rise of Islam in the mainstream political landscape. Even while the secular parties work to block this emergence, the voice of the people is saying otherwise. Turkey has built a reputation as one of the greatest functioning democracies in the Middle East, which is now seemingly threatened by the appearance of religion that pervades other republics like Egypt and Syria. With the history of military intervention into politics, the Turkish people now face the possibilities of the repression of the public will or the detrimental creation of Islamic militancy to counter any secular moves in government. With all parties claiming to be the champion of the new Turkey, and willing the people down their respective courses, it is a dangerous time. Either state action against religion will occur, which could forcibly suppress the political voice of the people, or it is possible that an emergent "Iran syndrome" could transpire which could shatter Turkeys relations with the West and risk the political well being of the country.

This piece was written by , President, Middle East Information Network.
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