What Price for the Golan Heights?
by Edward Graham

It was a cold morning atop the Golan Heights. The Syrian border patrol had been staring through the chain-link fence since I stepped off my bus. After a few minutes one of the guards picked up a rock, tucked it inside his coat to hide it, and glanced around to check the position of Israeli soldiers near the fence. He slowly made his way to the Syrian side of the presumably mine laden separator and tossed the rock over the double fencing. Fearing that this was the beginning of Syrian agitation of the IDF, I was shocked when the rock thumped down between my feet. "A gift for you," the Syrian guard called, "since you are there, you will never be able to come here." An eloquent reminder of the ban on any passport bearing an Israeli stamp, as mine obviously did, from being allowed to enter Syria. The gates of the Israeli occupied Golan Heights were the closest I would get to Syria, at least on this trip. Embarrassed and suitably abashed by my presumptions, I greeted and thanked the soldier in Arabic, earning smiles from Syria and cold stares from Israel.

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) stationed on the Golan Heights played a special role in the "security" of Israel. One of the border guards took time out from his patrol to show me that with his binoculars he could see Damascus, the Syrian capital, the expanse of the twenty mile "Security Zone" in southern Lebanon, and most of the northern Galilee region of Israel. "We are in a unique position," he explained, " if anyone wants to attack Israel, we can see them coming, and stop them before they ever get here. We can never give up the Golan, our security depends on it."

I began making my way towards the UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces) station on the heights. Mistaking me for an Israeli tourist, a guard jeep slowed down next to me and asked for a cigarette. In my broken Hebrew I attempted to apologize. In a quick switch to perfect English the guard began to explain his day to me. "This is my second day on duty here, I have another three months, and already I hate this place. Really. Im from Beer Sheva, what the hell do I care if Israel keeps the Golan?" He stopped another tourist and secured two cigarettes, one for himself and the traditional gift to your companion. I accepted, and he continued. " I really feel bad for the UN soldiers here, maybe even for the Syrians. I cant stand this place, if it were up to me, Id open the gates and let Syria take this lump back today. Im not kidding."

This struck me as a perfect example of the dichotomy prevalent in Israel regarding the Occupied Territories. During my travels to Gaza, throughout the West Bank, and up to the Golan Heights, there always seemed to be a representative of both schools of thought dominant in Israeli politics. The two soldiers on the Golan, serving together, but of radically different political views. Each one indicative of either the dovish, left wing Labor dominated parties of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, or the hawkish right wing Likud Bloc currently led by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The entire nation of Israel, occupied territories included, appears to be split over the ultimate question in Israeli thought: do you sacrifice land for peace?

History of the Occupied Golan Heights

Timeline of the Israel-Syria struggle for Golan

1948-1967: Syrian military use the Golan as an artillery staging area for attacks against
the northern Galilee region of Israel. Syrian artillery could reach the cities of Tiberias, and Ein Gev, while Syrian missles could reach Haifa, Afula, and Hadera.

Jan-Apr 1967: Syrian anti-Israeli activities increase. Numerous artillery and mine laying operations commence from Golan.  Terrorizing of Israel border patrols.

June 1967: During the "Six Day War" Israel occupies the Jordanian West Bank, Egyptian Gaza Strip and Sinai, and the  Syrian Golan Heights.

1967-1973: Israel establishes 18 Nahal settlements in the Golan. 70,000 Syrian refugees flee Israeli occupation behind the 1967 armistice line.

October 1973: The "Yom Kippur" or "Ramadan" War. Syrian forces recapture 50% of the Golan territories with assistance  from Iraq and Kuwait. Israel recaptures entirety of Golan and additional Syrian land. 15,000 additional refugees flee to Syria proper.

May 1974: Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement signed. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)  established to patrol de-militarized zone between Israel and Syria. "Areas of Limited Force" agreed to and established by either side.

Dec 1981: The Israeli Knesset approves annexation of the Golan Heights: The United Nations Security Council adopts  resolution 497 stating that Israel's annexation is null and void and against International Law.

1967-1983: 30 Nahal Settlements established in the Israeli occupied Golan Heights.

June 1982: Israel invades Southern Lebanon. By August, Israel withdraws from Beiruit, but keeps a twenty-mile "Security  Zone" in Lebanon as a buffer against PLO excursions into Northern Israel and the Golan Heights.

Dec 1982: The United Nations General Assembly Plenary Session adopts resolution 49, revisiting UNSCR 497 (1981) and demands Israel withdraw from all occupied Syrian lands. The US votes against the resolution.

A Brief History of Occupation

The Golan Heights has been the premiere sight for Syrian bombardment of the Zionist state since the latters creation in 1948. The Golan had been officially granted to Syria in the 1923 border partition of British occupied lands. In the build-up towards the 1967 war, Syrian military operations against the Galilee were increased. Raids across the border from Golan were used to lay mines on Israeli roads, and to establish sniper positions within Israel. These, combined with artillery raids from the top of Golan, were Syrias message to the fledgling Israeli state. " We shall never call for nor accept peace. We shall only accept war. We have resolved to drench this land with your blood, to oust you aggressors, to throw you into the sea," announced Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in 1966.¹

By the beginning of the Six Day War in 1967 Syrian attacks from the Golan Heights had destroyed 205 houses, 175 acres of fruit orchards, and 75 acres of grain. 32 Israelis has been wounded or killed by Syrian raids from Golan between February 1966 and April 1967. The Settlement at Gadot was destroyed by a 200 round Syrian artillery raid in April 1967. Prior to Israels preemptive strike in June 1967, the Syrian military had taken to shelling anything that moved in the Galilee, including cows in Ein Gev. On the morning of June 9, during the war, Israeli troops began to scale the Golan Heights. After a 27 hour battle Israel had captured the Heights at the cost of 1,000 Syrian soldiers, and 115 Israeli deaths. Both Israel and Syria agreed to the UNs call for a cease fire on June 10, 1967.

Between 1967 and the Yom Kippur war of 1973, the Israeli government began a serious campaign to build and cultivate the captured Golan Heights. 18 Israeli settlements were established and numerous farms and vineyards were begun. The Golan became famous in Israel for both its wineries, and orchards. Israeli settlers had to continue to tolerate Syrian shelling, but at a lesser rate. In October 1973, Egypt and Syria, with support from numerous Arab nations, launched a war against Israel. In the north, Syria, along with contingents from Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan launched a penetration raid into the Golan and Galilee regions. The Syrian forces were able to recapture roughly 50% of the Occupied Golan, before the Israel army could respond. By the end of the war on October 24, Israel had taken back all of the Golan Heights, and had penetrated an additional 15 miles into Syrian territory before the UN established a cease fire accord.

Agreeing to return to its pre-1973 borders, Israel refortified the Golan Heights, intensified agricultural projects, and continued to build settlement projects in the territory. The UNDOF zone was established and both Israel and Syria agreed to withdraw their heavy forces back ten miles from that border. Israel established reconnaissance and electronic surveillance posts on the Golan to monitor activity in southeastern Syria, including Damascus, southern Lebanon and the Galilee region of northern Israel. The Golan was considered by foreign parties to be included in the territories addressed by UN resolutions 242 and 338, regarding the inadmissibility of land captured in war. But, Israel refused to act upon either of these resolutions and in 1981 the Israeli Knesset, or legislature, approved a military plan to officially annex the Golan Heights as part of Greater Israel.

Since the 1973 war several changes have occurred in the Middle East. A majority of Arab countries have acknowledged Resolutions 242 and 338, including official recognition of the Israeli state, in an attempt to bring Israel to the negotiating table. The "Land for Peace" policy started during this time, was an attempt to cajole Israel into surrendering the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights in return for recognition and peace treaties with its Arab neighbors. While progress has been made between Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel and Jordan, the Golan Heights have remained a sticking point in negotiations between Israel and Syria. A simple summation may be stated as; Israel demands peace, then will consider territorial compromise, while Syria demands the return of the Golan as a step towards peace.

The Positions of the Parties

The government of Israel present numerous reasons for its continued occupation of the Golan Heights. The primary amongst these is the issue of security. Since its creation the Israeli state has been obsessed with its own security. The occupation of Arab land, according to the IDF, serves as a buffer zone against further Arab attack. Presumably, the militaries of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt would hesitate having to cross Arab land to get to the Israeli positions. Furthermore, Israel has blurred those distinct Arab/Israeli lines with its Nahal settlement programs; placing large Israeli populations in the midst of Arab communities, attacking armies would be suitably hesitant about attacking without clear and distinct targets. As for the Golan Heights, Israel has turned this range of hills into a military fortress. Following the 1967 and 1973 wars, and Israels 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Golan has become the IDFs premiere reconnaissance station for its northern borders. The electronic monitoring stations positioned on Mount Hermon can maintain a clear watch over Syrian military maneuvers outside Damascus and south towards Israel, while simultaneously monitoring IDF positions within the "Security Zone" inside Lebanon.

These two actions, surveillance of the Syrian military, and defense against Hizbullah attacks in Lebanon are top priority to IDF commanders. "Words are not enough about the Golan Heights. We must put them into actions... Withdrawal from the Golan is unthinkable, even in times of peace. Anyone considering withdrawal from the Golan Heights would be abandoning Israels security. Let us invest, all of us together, in order to fulfill our obligations to the Golan Heights. And to you residents- those who made the Golan Heights what it is- you have all my respect."² This quote from then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin appears to highlight the position dominant in Israeli politics, peace with Syria, but no return of the Golan Heights.

What is so important about the Golan Heights? Well, aside from the obvious military advantages of its capture, the Golan offers much to Israels prosperity. It is a symbol of Israeli strength. Twice, when its army was vastly outnumbered, Israel was able to overcome the seemingly dominant force of the Syrian army. The creation and sustaining of agriculture in a once barren land is one the very symbols of the Zionist ideal. The Kibbutz project to recapture the lands of Israel from the desert is highlighted by the success of both farms and the wineries of the Golan. Under Israeli control the Golan has become an agricultural giant with 8,100 hectares of land being reclaimed for cultivation, 46,000 hectares of grazing land for animals, 2,531 hectares of orchards and vineyards. The region maintains 15, 000 head of cattle and produces 12,000 tons of saleable meat products per year. The Golan now has 32 Jewish communities and 4 Druze villages, with populations of 14,000 and 17,000 people respectively. The Golan receives 1,750,000 tourist visitors per year.

The Final argument for Israeli maintenance of the Golan is water. 30% of Israels water supply comes from the Kinneret Basin (Sea of Galilee). It is estimated that 300 million cubic meters of water flows from stream or wadis in the Golan Heights which drain into the Jordan River and the Kinneret Basin. Another 100 million cubic meters is estimated to come from rainfall directly into the Kinneret Basin. Along with these figures comes consideration for the 500 million cubic meters of water that flow from the Hatsbani, Dan, and Banias sources of the River Jordan, in the north of the Golan region. Allowing for an estimated 250 million cubic meters in yearly evaporation, it is believed that the Golan region and the Kinneret Basin provide Israel with 33% of its total water supply. Included in the sheer numbers, is the consideration of the "unbelievable" quality of Kinneret water in Israel. These facts outline the environmental portion of Israels refusal to return the Golan Heights to Syria.

On the opposite side of the border the reasons are not so numerous. If the average Syrian is asked why Israel should return the Golan, the answer is a simple, but dignified, "because, it is ours." Since the initial loss of the Golan in 1967, Syria has made numerous plans or attempts to recapture the land, all have failed. But, unlike Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt, Syrias Assad has often refused to sell out the Arab nation in a brokered peace accord. This is not surprising though. Egypt was able to gain a portion of the Sinai immediately after the 1973 war, with the 1975 Sinai Agreement, and a return of the full Sinai following the 1978 Camp David Accords. The difference here is the quality of land and the desire of the occupier. Israel captured both the Sinai and Golan as buffer zones against future attack. Following the 1975 agreement Israel could rely on US forces in the Sinai, and following 1978, the peace treaty with Egypt as just such protection. However posturing made by the Syrian government has never calmed, nor has the promise of peace been made for future concessions. Finally, while Sinai was a buffer zone, the Golan Heights were an investment in Israels future. The agricultural and water resources made the Golan far more than a security zone, and much harder to return.

Syria simply maintains that the Golan is Syrian land, and must be returned to ensure peace with Israel. As a political maneuver Syrias President Hafez al-Assad linked the plight of his government with Israel to that of the Palestinian plight: " had Syria thought of its own interests only...it would have ...achieved a unilateral solution...For its long term interest, Israel favors the abandonment of the Golan and the conclusion of a separate deal with Syria. If Syria had been regionally oriented, it would have proceeded from its regional [i.e. state] interests. But, it did not and will not do this...The Golan was occupied in a battle waged for Palestine."³ This was Assads justification for refusing a separate peace with Israel. Not that the Golan was unimportant to Syria, in fact Assad would not settle for less, simply that it was part of the larger whole in the region. Assad argued that Israels demand for secure borders at the expense of Syrias national sovereignty was unbalanced and out of date in the age of missiles.

Al-Assad bears a prime responsibility in this confrontation. It was partially his responsibility that the Golan was lost, thus he cannot afford, politically, to settle for less than its return. Syria demands the Golans return in whole, partition, as often offered by Israel, is unacceptable. Syria is concerned with the value of security, i.e. removing the Israeli threat from Damascus, and symbolism, the Baathist regime wishes to regain its honor lost in 1967, and deny Israel the satisfaction of victory. Assad has often had to consider giving primary consideration to the Golan and abandoning his championship of the Palestinian cause. After the 1988 League of Arab States Summit in Algiers, Syria threatened that if the PLO were to seek a separate peace with Israel, Syria would "no longer carry the banner" for the Palestinians and would be free to narrow its national interests to the return of the Golan Heights. When such a peace was made, Syria served to criticize the whole process warning the Palestinians that they would never achieve their goals, and would be forced under an Israeli controlled autonomy. Syrians, Assad said, were simply too proud to concede their rights, just to win world opinion.

An Israeli-Syrian Peace Process?

Much has changed since the 1988 Summit. The Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords have put the Israelis and the Palestinians on the hard road towards peace. Israel and Jordan made official, public peace, and even Syria has been approached by the Doves of Israel. Although the beginning of the road is there, the path to Israeli-Syrian peace is still long and hard to follow. The road began with a man. Yitzhak Rabin, who campaigned in 1992 to never return the Golan Heights, had a change of heart. Suddenly Israeli concession of the Golan seemed to be a reality, if a distant one. The United States began its role as mediator between the two nations, but to little success. Following the 1994 Jordanian agreement to lease a certain percentage of land to Israeli farmers, Assad went on the attack: "Our land is ours. We consider it would be blasphemy for any country to speak of leasing its land to other leaderships. And I doubt that anyone would intend that Syria would lease its land to Israel. Anyone who dreams...that Syria would lease its land is shamefully wrong and making a major mistake. If people adopt this theory, it will lead to the opposite of peace. There wouldnt be peace...even if we live tens or hundreds of years, unless the land is restored in full."⁴

This was a blow to Israeli Foreign Minster Shimon Peres plans for peace with Syria. Preferring a deal with Syria similar to the Jordan accords, as opposed to the Camp David Accords, was the primary interest of the labor government at the time. Surprising its western allies and Israel, Egypts President Hosni Mubarak, also attacked the idea of leasing land. Mubarak said he remained optimistic about the possibilities for peace, but joined the Syrian camp in trying to calm excessive expectations. "As for a solution between Israel and Syria, it will take its time. Optimism does not mean it will be solved tomorrow or the day after," Mubarak said. " There is optimism because there are intentions of peace among all Arab parties but there are problems which require more time for negotiation."⁵ The Rabin government learned of these problems early on.

Due the excessively slow nature of negotiation with the Palestinians, Rabin turned to Syria for results. But, Rabin was even more confused by his dealings with Assad. "Assad seemed in no hurry for a deal; worse, in his few public remarks he displayed no awareness of what he would be required to give in return -not just a cessation of hostilities, but a full-scale peace accord with open borders, exchange of embassies, trade and tourism, and lots of demilitarized territory between the Israeli-Syrian border and Damascus. Assad expected to get the same terms Sadat had gotten from Begin - the restoration of all occupied territories up to the last square inch. But in return he proposed none of the offerings Sadat had given Israel, most especially the gift of recognition that Sadat had bestowed by stepping foot on Israeli soil."⁶

It seems obvious that Israel and Syria will never sit face to face and discuss their differences. The role of mediator, and perhaps facilitator, will constantly be needed. The United States seem to take this role early on. The US involvement has led to talks between Israel and Syria on the ambassadorial level in Washington, since February 1994. Focused discussions on security arrangements have led to two meetings between the Israeli and Syrian Chiefs-of-Staff in December 1994, and June 1995. Following this meeting between the Israeli and Syrian Ambassadors, Syrian Chief of Staff General Shihabi, and Israeli Chief of Staff General Ehud Barak a short paper was drafted entitled "The Aims and Principles of the Security Arrangements." Amongst other members of the US State Department, some of the more active players have been President Clinton who has met twice with al-Assad, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who made numerous trips to the Middle East during his tenure.

An abrupt change in the Rabin/Peres government has allowed talks with Syria to be productive. Yitzhak Rabin changed his stance on Golan, conceding that withdrawal may be necessary for peace. With this in mind the Israeli Foreign Ministry was able to develop the context of a peace settlement which simultaneously addressed four key issues: the depth of the Golan withdrawal, the schedule and duration for withdrawal, the stages the withdrawal and the linkage between them and normalization, and agreement over security arrangements. Before his death in 1995, Yitzhak Rabin did announce that any peace treaty negotiated with Syria would be put to a national referendum before it would be signed. As Rabins successor, Shimon Peres added his own elements to the negotiation; that the comprehensiveness of the agreement and the linkage between the Israeli-Syrian agreement and an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, an emphasis on the peace: the peace with Syria should not be a cold or hollow peace, and the importance of embedding the Syrian-Israeli peace in a regional economic package.⁷

Following the assassination of Rabin in November, the Syrians agreed to continue negotiations under Peres government without preconditions and with flexibility in the form of the negotiations. Israeli Ambassador Itamar Rabinovitch met with Syrian Ambassador to the US, Mualem at the Aspen Institutes Wye River Conference Center in December 1995, and January 1996. These renewed discussions were highly detailed and comprehensive in scope covering security, the elements that make up the notion of full peace, quality of peace, normalization of relations, and water issues. Both sides agreed that a solid basis for further discussions had been established and some of the ideas created at the Wye Center were forwarded to the Israeli and Syrian governments for consideration.

From these negotiations came three components that Ambassador Rabinovitch highlighted in a speech to the Washington Institute in January 1996. The first component he outlined was the statement by Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara, on the premium that needs to be put on keeping peace and quiet on the Lebanese-Israeli border was an excellent illustration of a positive statement that was very well received and registered in Israel. The second component was in a response and agreement to resume the negotiations without preconditions and with elements if flexibility in the from of those negotiations. The Syrians decided not to raise the level of negotiators to a political level, but to empower and increase the authority of Ambassador Mualem and give him and his colleagues a larger mandate both in terms of substance and in terms of atmosphere. The third component was an agreement to deal for a while with Israeli side of the equation.⁸

Peace with a Hostile Partner

It seemed that the transition of power from Rabin to Peres would not have lasting effects on the Syrian-Israeli peace track. The Wye negotiations continued on productive levels through the end of 1995 and into 1996. However, foreign circumstances, and the looming Israeli elections would force a change in the Israeli camp. In early April 1996 Katayusha rockets, launched from southern Lebanon would begin raining down on the northern Galilee, specifically the village of Kiryat Shmona near the Lebanese "security zone." The IDF would respond out of sorts with Operation Grapes of Wrath, a massive artillery and air campaign against Hizbullah targets in southern Lebanon. The campaign would lead Israel to attacks against targets as far into Lebanon as Beirut. The operation was canceled when Israeli jets bombed a UN refugee camp at Qana, an action UN investigators have ruled as a deliberate attack against a civilian target.

International outrage at Israel for the operation would put the Peres government on the defensive. The military action served to bolster Peres' stance as weak on terrorism as a rallying cry against challenger Binyamin Netanyahu's speeches about using the IDF to defend the Northern Galilee from Hizbullah attacks. The following month Israel would hold its general parliamentary elections, including a direct election for Prime Minister. The elections would end with Binyamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister, and the conservative right-wing Likud party leading a coalition government in the Knesset. In June 1996 the Likud drafted its "Guidelines of the Government of Israel," which would outline the parties and the new government's plans for the future of the state.

The guidelines laid out the future goals the first being: "achieving peace with all our neighbors, while safeguarding national and personal security."⁹ Under the heading of Peace, Security, and Foreign Relations the paper had 21 points of which were stated " The government of Israel will work to broaden the circle of peace with all of its neighbors, for the good of Israel's citizens and the regions inhabitants, while safeguarding Israel's vital interests. The government will reinforce and develop it peaceful relations with Egypt and Jordan. The government of Israel will conduct negotiations with Syria without pre-conditions...the government of Israel will oppose the establishment of a Palestinian State or any other foreign sovereignty west of the Jordan River, and will oppose "the right of return" of Arab populations to any part of the land of Israel west of the Jordan River. The government views the Golan Heights as essential to the security of the state and its water resources. Retaining Israeli sovereignty over the Golan will be the basis for an arrangement with Syria."¹⁰ It was based on these points that negotiations between Israel and Syria broke down, and progress was halted on future initiatives.

After a period of seemingly ignoring the peace process in the region, the Netanyahu government began working diplomatic ties through the United States. The initial Likud move was to offer Beirut a "Lebanon First" program, dealing with the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon before discussing peace with Syria. The plan announced that Israel was ready to withdraw Israeli troops from Lebanon if Hizbullah guerrillas were disarmed and the security of Israel was guaranteed. This proposal was rejected by both al-Assad and Lebanese President Elias Hrawi at a meeting in Beirut. "Syria and Lebanon first...at the same time, in the same steps. Lebanon and Syria are tied in a Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination."¹¹ Assad went on to say that the message from Netanyahu was not indicative of a leader serious or committed to peace. Hrawi described the Israeli offer as a "trap" aimed at sabotaging the good ties between Beirut and Damascus. The two leaders issues a statement saying "we are committed to the peace process, based on UN resolutions, and the principle of land for peace and all obligations and agreements decided during the past five years."¹²

By August 1996 the Unites States, Russia, and the European Union all had envoys attempting to restart the stalled Middle East peace process. The Netanyahu government extended its first offer in the same month. The message, sent via Washington, stated that Israel was committed to peace and wanted to open negotiations with Syria without preconditions. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara said Syria would not agree to renewed talks with Israel unless previous understandings reached with the Rabin/Peres government would be honored. "There are no new chapters in negotiations. There are commitments and agreements which should be honored. Any other formula is a return to the zero point and this is not acceptable to us in Syria," stated al-Shara.¹³

By September Israeli military actions in Lebanon, plans for oil drilling in the Golan Heights, the testing of new Israeli military technology, and inaction on the Israeli-Palestinian front had led to increased tensions between Israel and Syria. Statements from Damascus said that the policies of the Netanyahu government had caused tension in the Middle East and could lead to war. Syria moved 12,000 of its troops inside Lebanon towards the Israeli border and within striking position of Israeli forces in the Golan. Netanyahu responded by saying that Syrian troop movements were an attempt by Damascus to pressure Israel into unilateral territorial concessions, moves he said Israel would never make. The US responded by sending envoy Dennis Ross to try and smooth out the situation in the region. The Syrian newspaper al-Ba'ath responded by saying that "Ross's tour might not make tangible results because it will again be confronted with Netanyahu's obstinacy."¹⁴

In the early months of 1997 the peace process was beginning to reshape between Israel and Syria. Egypt and France began rallying their support behind Syria, pressing for Israeli recognition of earlier agreements with Syrian negotiators. In an attempt to at least bring Syria back to the table, Netanyahu said he would "take note" of territorial concessions proposed by previous Israeli governments, but he vowed he would not be "bound" by land-for-peace offers made by his predecessors.¹⁵ "If President Assad does prove, soon I hope, that he chooses the path to peace, he will find us reasonable and cooperative partners," Netanyahu said.¹⁶ However, in an interview with the American TV show "Today" Netanyahu said he did not want to see Israeli negotiations with Syria end with Israel handing over the Golan Heights in his lifetime. "I plan to live a long time, and...if it's up to me, that is not what I'd like to see at the end of the negotiations. And I think I've made that clear many times."¹⁷

Resolving the Positions

Are negotiations between Syria and Israel permanently deadlocked? Is there the possibility of concession on either side? While neither seems likely, this is not a resolution to the problem in the Golan. Syria maintains its position of the Golan first, then peace can be discussed, while on the other side of the table Israel demands peace first, and a discussion of the Golan afterwards. Israel has tried to negotiate with Lebanon, trying to forge a peace with Syria's closest ally, thus forcing Syria into concession, a tactic that has failed. The Netanyahu government has offered concessions over its "security zone" in Lebanon, saying that if Syria would cease its funding of terrorist organizations, like Hizbullah, peace could be achieved in Lebanon. It would "essentially require the dismantling of Hizbullah and the fanning out of Lebanese troops up to the border to prevent the approach of terrorists to Israel's border. if we could have that, yes, I would withdraw from Lebanon instantly," Netanyahu said.¹⁸

But, as for Syrian-Israeli peace, the formula seems impossible. Neither side trusts the other to have military emplacements on the Golan. The United Nations does not want its UNDOF forces in Golan to become peacekeepers between two warring factions. In early 1996 the Peres government forwarded the idea of US troops stationed on the Golan as monitors and peacekeepers, an idea the Clinton administration supported. While this is a seemingly logical solution, dependent on Israeli withdrawal, there has been protest from within the US military establishment. In a presentation to the Heritage Foundation, Deputy Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies, Thomas Moore, and Senior Policy Analyst, James Philips outlined five serious drawbacks to US peacekeepers on the Golan. They were:

1. The Golan Heights present a more formidable peacekeeping challenge than the existing US peacekeeping mission on the Sinai Peninsula. Unlike American troops assigned to the multinational peacekeeping force on the Egyptian-Israeli border in the Sinai since 1982, peacekeeping forces on the Golan will be sandwiched between two large armored forces in a much smaller area. Moreover, Syria historically has been much more hostile to the US than has Egypt, which is now a US ally. Thus, a Golan peacekeeping mission would be much riskier.
2. Terrorism would pose a threat to US troops. US peacekeeping forces in the Golan will be close to southern Lebanon, which is a major staging area for numerous terrorist groups that oppose Arab-Israeli peace.
3. It could adversely affect US-Israeli relations. An American presence on the Golan will constrain Israel's military options more than Syria's and will sap Israel's self-reliance. In the long run, this could strain US-Israeli relations.
4. It could be too costly and too much of a drain on US forces. A small force will be unable to defend itself against possible terrorist or Syrian military attacks, while a large force will be a major drain on active US Armed forces.
5. Americans are not needed. other countries can play the same peacekeeping role. The UNDOF, comprised of troops from Austria, Canada, Finland, and Poland, has been deployed on the Golan for almost 22 years to monitor the 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement.¹⁹

However, there is much debate within the military ranks about this possible mission. Stephen Gotowicki, a Lt. Colonel in the US Army, says "their presentations usually adopt a "worst case" approach and contend that the outcomes [of a mission in Golan] would have dire existential consequences for Israel and present dangers for American soldiers: an Israeli withdrawal will lead to a surprise Syrian attack; a US force interpositioned between Israel and Syria would restrict Israeli military options; a US force could not provide Israel the security arrangements it requires; US soldiers would be subject to terrorist attack" but, he continues "US forces on Golan would not be observable for targeting or in range of most indirect fire weapons, such as Katayushas, fired from Lebanon. An attack on US facilities or troops on the Golan would require terrorist penetration on foot (since it is unlikely that Israel, Syria, or Jordan would allow them to across the border in vehicles), in generally open, unforested terrain over long distances. Assuming normal and reasonable security measures, the approach of terrorists on the Golan would be detected."²⁰

It is obvious that some arrangement for mutual security must be made for a withdrawal from the Golan to occur. Syria will not accept Israeli military presence on the Golan, nor will Israel accept Syrian. Syria initially rejected the idea of US military presence, citing US-Israeli relations as untrustworthy to defend Syrian interests, but have come to agree to this possible condition. In 1994 President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive -25 (PDD-25), a comprehensive guide to multilateral peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era. It later be PDD-25 that the United States used to reject the idea of a unilateral peacekeeping mission in the Golan.

The bolstering, or enlargement of the UNDOF contingent in the Golan is another possibility. The United States and Syria would most likely accept this idea. The US could use a multilateral force to provide burden sharing with other countries, credibility through the UN name, and would minimize the need for US personnel. Syria would prefer a UN contingent based on its belief of support from within the UN, both the Arab bloc, and its former suppliers China and Russia, both Security Council members. Israel would prefer a non-UN based mission on the Golan. The Israeli government views the UN as indecisive, inefficient, and in the past unfriendly to Israel. Israel has also had a history of disagreements with both the UNTSO force in Egypt, and UNIFIL in Lebanon. An expanded UNDOF would, however, have several benefits, namely minimal start-up costs as it already exists and is in place, it would provide member states with extensive institutional mission experience. UNDOF would benefit from its inherent multilateral basis, and would show established international confidence in Israel and Syria.

A final possibility would be the creation of a Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO)-styled organization. If the mission in the Sinai could be declared a success, it could be possible to relocate the existing MFO structure to Golan. Certain benefits offered by the expansion of UNDOF would be lost on this option, though. Start up costs would be significantly higher, mission equipment and a support infrastructure would have to be moved to the area. A new force would not have the institutional knowledge that a renewed UNDOF force would have about geography, or operational measures. A command and control arrangement would have to be established by all parties involved, and an operating procedure would have to be created.

Of course, any discussion of disengagement forces or agreements is academic. If Israel and Syria cannot agree to terms of withdrawal and/or mutual recognition there will be no need for any internationally led peacekeeping forces. Groups within both Israel and Syria seem divided over the future of the Golan and the positions of their governments. Ze'ev Maoz, Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University put it this way; "The claim that the Golan provides strategic depth that protects the Galilee has led to an absurdity: We are simply transferring the Galilee to the Golan, and the problem of defending the Galilee today will turn into a problem of how to defend the Jewish population of the Golan in a few years hence."²¹ This contrasts sharply with the standard Likud position of maintaining the Golan as a defensive buffer against Syrian aggression. While the official Syrian position has been enunciated by President Hafez al-Assad; "Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a strategy that secures Arab rights, ends the Israeli occupation, and enables all peoples in the region to live in peace, security and dignity. In honor we fought; in honor we negotiate; and in honor we shall make peace."²²

Both Israel and Syria fear the military threat from the other. The threat from the IDF is a real one, though the actual use would be questionable. A majority in Israel support the peace process, and would not readily acquiesce to another military confrontation with Syria. While Syria maintains a ready military force, its materiel supply has suffered since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its support of the Syrian military machine. In addition to this the Syrian economy is stagnant, due largely to long-term socialist style intervention in the economy that has prevented strong economic growth. The idea of US foreign aid to Syria, in a formula similar to the Camp David Accords would be attractive to Syria, but does not hold strong support in the US Congress, nor from Israel.

Any future agreements will be based on the ideas expressed here. Security is paramount to both Israel and Syria. The return of occupied lands is primary goal of the al-Assad government. Both sides are aware that direct negotiations will not bear fruit. Thus, the role the US has played in the past must be continued to promote progress on this track. While mediation, or foreign intervention is not necessary, the role that foreign dignitaries have played in dealings between Israel and Syria has set a precedent for how negotiations will continue. A secret deal similar to the Oslo Accords will, most likely, not be repeated on this topic. However, any agreement between Syria and Israel will necessitate that both sides be completely comfortable with the arrangement. No questions or doubts can remain, for if they do, any peace will be a cold or unproductive peace and could lead to renewed tensions between the two governments. Both sides have commitments to make outside the realm of direct negotiations. Israel must continue the course of negotiations with the Palestinians, and eventually secure a peace with Lebanon. Syria must work to end the perceived threat from terrorism, namely its supposed sponsorship of anti-Israeli groups in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories. At this time Syria is the key to bringing Lebanon to the negotiating table, but will not perpetuate this role until an agreement is made regarding the Golan. The Likud government in Israel, or the Israeli populace, has to make serious decisions if it wants the prospect of peace to continue on a realistic tangent.

This piece was written by , President, Middle East Information Network.
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