Islamic Extremism & Modern Egypt
by Edward Graham

Background History

    The Arab Republic of Egypt has undergone significant changes since the beginning of the twentieth century. At that time Egypt was under the protection of the Ottoman Empire, a loose relationship with a seemingly independent monarchy in Cairo, and true power divided among the Sultan in Istanbul, and the occupation forces of the British government. With the fall of the Empire following the first World War, Egypt became an independent nation, but ruling authority still resided in the British Occupational Governor, with a figurehead monarch in Cairo. Following the Arab defeat in the Israeli War of Independence in 1948 a group of Egyptian military officers began plotting to overthrow the throne and remove British influence from Egypt permanently. The 1952 Free Officers Revolution effectively eliminated King Farouk from power and established a Revolutionary Command Council as the governing body of Egypt.

    The true leader of this revolution, a young colonel named Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser, began a process whereby Egypt became a truly independent state formed under his idea of Arab Nationalism and the Socialist ideal of government. Nasser became a hero to both the Egyptian people, and the Arab world at large as a symbol of resistance to Western imperialism in the Middle East. During his tenure as President of Egypt, Nasser's "perfection" would falter in the face of several problems. His courtship with the Soviet Union would mark him as a pariah to western governments, and to certain elements among his own population. Both the failure of the United Arab Republic and the Arab defeat in the Six Day War against Israel would mark an end to a period of Nasser's unquestionable power. Under his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, Egypt would begin to take on very different roles both domestically and internationally.

    Mohammed Ahmed Anwar al-Sadat assumed the Presidency of Egypt in 1971 following the death of Nasser. He was immediately made aware of the shadow which his administration would permanently operate under. It seemed the entire Arab world mourned the loss of Nasser. Millions flooded the streets of Cairo to follow his funeral procession. "Nasser left a void that few men could have filled. Anwar Sadat had been completely eclipsed by Nasser. Sadat, who was neither a charismatic nor popular leader, lacked political legitimacy. Tellingly, in the early days of his rule, Sadats picture was always seen alongside that of Nasser."¹ In an attempt to eliminate this fact, the Sadat administration adopted several policies in an effort to detach itself from Nassers legacy. Among the more notable of these policies were Sadats Infitah, or economic "open door," and his personal and political use of Islam as a form of legitimacy for his government. It is these policies that have shaped the course of Egyptian politics over the last twenty-five years and are often blamed for the state of Egyptian stagnation and instability today.

Introduction

    The economic and political policies of the Sadat administration, and those of the succeeding Mubarak regime, as well as the economic and social conditions existing in Egypt today, have given rise to a growing religious backed opposition in the population. These problems stem from the inception of Anwar al-Sadat as president in 1971. After pledging to continue Nassers policies, the new government altered its course towards Sadats own agenda. It started with the arrest of ninety-one "Nasserites," some of whom held high position in government, on charges of treason. The largest change made to government structure was the drafting of the 1971 Permanent Constitution, which laid out Egypts future. The constitution defined Egypt as a "democratic, socialist state based on the alliance of the working forces of the people," it further called on Islamic Jurisprudence to be the principle source of legislation in the country, and the president was defined as the most powerful member of the government.

    This constitution contained one of the very noticeable differences between Egypt under Nasser, and its future. The mention of Islam was a radical alteration of the accepted secularism of the Nasser regime. Sadat attempted to use Islam as a means of gaining much needed political and popular legitimacy. He took on the title of the "Believer President," had television coverage of his attendance at daily prayers, pushed for increased Islamic programming in the media, as well as established religious classes in schools. The Sadat government funded the construction of new mosques, used Islamic rhetoric in public statements, and promoted the formation of Islamic student organizations in schools and universities nationwide.

    Sadats 1971 Rectification Revolution, as it would come to be known, steered Egypt down a new path. The Sadat administration would dramatically change course away from Nasserist policy. In 1972 Sadat began a dialogue with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and later that year Sadat would order the removal of all Soviet advisors currently residing in Egypt. At this time Egypts economy was in shambles as a result of the 1967 war with Israel. Oil reserves from the Israeli occupied Sinai peninsula were lost, the Suez Canal remained closed due to Nassers scuttling blockade, the United States refused communication with Egypt and the Soviet Union failed to produce any aid to the country. Yet, by 1973 Egypts military had reached a state of rebuilt readiness and Sadats next plan went into effect. In October, 1973 the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal into the Sinai and began the Yom Kippur, or Ramadan, War. Although a military loss to Egypt, the resulting peace treaty, brokered by the United States, returned control of the Sinai peninsula to Egypt.

    Immediately following the war, considered a victory to Egyptians due to the concession of the Sinai, Sadat began his policy of economic reforms, the Infitah. The president was quoted as saying: " just as the crossing had brought victory on the battlefield, so this second crossing will bring victory on the homefront in the shape of prosperity for all."² This system was to transform the internal structure of the Egyptian economy, a consolidation of the public sector, costing it its hegemony and strength, while simultaneously promoting private sector growth. The effects of this system were immediate and, for the most part, disastrous. The encouragement of foreign trade resulted in a large trade deficit brought on by "extravagant" importation of consumer and intermediary goods, coupled with a drop in overall exports. The socioeconomic structure was faced with the emergence of a new upper class, mainly merchants and middlemen, aggravated inflation on an unheard of scale, with the majority of economic burden falling on the middle and lower classes.³

    However, Infitah did accomplish one of Sadats intended goals, garnering the attention of the Western powers. They began supplying Egypt with foreign aid in attempts to keep the open-door policy alive. The largest of these donors was the United States, while the largest critic of these polices was the Soviet Union. The US began using foreign aid to push Egypt toward the Sinai II Disengagement Agreement with Israel, while Moscow believed that such actions were eliminating Soviet influence in the Middle East. In 1976 Sadat eliminated the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between Egypt and the USSR, this was followed by the 1977 suspension of all cotton sales to the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries, effectively ending any bilateral trade protocols between Egypt and these countries. Sadats next step westward came in 1981 when Sadat himself ordered the expulsion of the Soviet ambassador, diplomatic officers, and embassy technicians, after accusing them of being involved in a plot to overthrow the Egyptian government.

    In November 1977 Anwar al-Sadat boarded a plane bound for Jerusalem, the newly proclaimed capitol of the State of Israel. This act would put into motion the process leading to the 1978 Camp David Accords ending hostilities between Egypt and Israel. This act, and the subsequent signing of the 1979 Treaty of Peace with the State of Israel would ostracize Egypt from its Arab neighbors. A summit of Arab leaders was called in Baghdad, Iraq and the majority of Arab states voted to sever all relations with Egypt, Egypts membership in the League of Arab States was suspended and the organization moved to Tunisia, Egypt was removed from its membership in the Islamic Conference and the Organization of African Unity, and, finally, all loans and financial assistance from Arab states was cut off. Nationalist forces within Egypt declared their opposition to the treaty and began to rally in defense "of the Arab identity of Egypt." Sadats government lost its legitimacy with both its citizens and its neighbors.

    The tenure of the Sadat administration, the economic downswing brought on the Egyptian people by Infitah, the courtship of the United States and its allies, and finally the treaty with Israel brought about the end of Sadats regime in Egypt. On October 6, 1981, Lt. Khalid Islambuli, both an army officer and a member of the radical al-Jihad organization, would assassinate Sadat as the president reviewed a military parade through Cairo. Islambuli would become forever famous for this act and his statement of, "I am Khalid Islambuli, I have killed Pharaoh and I do not fear death."

The Opposition

    It is necessary to briefly examine the main opposition to the Egyptian government in the form of the Islamist elements. The largest of these is the Muslim Brotherhood, which is a self-proclaimed non-violent organization. There are a significant number of groups, many of whom may not even exist any longer, or may have changed their names. Not included here are Shabab Mohammed (Mohammeds Youth), Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration), Jamaat al-Muslimiin (The Society of Muslims), Salvation from Hell, and Jund Allah (The Army of God). R. Hrair Dekmejian, an American political scientist, had counted 175 different Islamist groups in the Middle East, some 74 percent of which can be labeled as "radical" or "militant." Others scholars quote a figure of 45 Islamist groups in Egypt alone.⁴

A. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimiin

    The Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 under the direction of founder and ideologue Hassan al-Banna, a school teacher and former disciple of the Islamic modernist Rashid Rida. Al-Bannas brotherhood started initially as a movement against Western imperialism, and grew to address the social ills of Egypt at the time. " Initial faith in liberal nationalism had been shaken by the defeat of the Arabs in Palestine, the creation of the State of Israel with British and American support, Egypts continued inability to shake off British occupation, massive unemployment, poverty, and corruption."⁵ Al-Banna saw Egyptian society as dependent on the west, politically weak, and culturally adrift. He initially had been an anti-colonial nationalist and had turned to religious revivalism in an attempt to restore the Muslim community, both in Egypt and internationally.

    The Brotherhood saw Western imperialism as a political, economic, and cultural threat to Muslim societies. Foreign penetration of the legal system, schools, and customs was perceived to be an even worse threat than political intervention, due to its threat to eliminate the Muslim identity. The Brotherhood saw itself as the ideological alternative to either Western capitalism or Marxism. Modernization, however, was not attacked. Al-Banna believed in modern organization and development, the creation of education systems, welfare services, and the use of modern technology for the Brotherhoods message to reach the population. The Brotherhood was able to recruit members from local mosques, secondary schools, universities, the merchant class, and trade unions. While the organization was quick to attack imperialism and the Wests cultural threat, al-Banna believed that the modern Muslim predicament was primarily caused by Muslims who failed to be Islamically observant.

    Although the Brotherhood was formed in the interests of socio-economic reform, eventually the organization became heavily involved in politics. In its attempts to gain political notoriety, the Brotherhood instead earned the ire of successive Egyptian governments. Hassan al-Banna was reportedly killed by Egyptian secret police in retaliation for believed Brotherhood involvement in an assassination attempt against a minister in King Farouks government. During the Nasser years the Muslim Brotherhood, under the leadership of Sayyid Qutb, would be one of the most vocal opponents of the socialist regime. It was during this time that the Ikhwan appears to have split into two separate missions, one of direct confrontation with the government, the other appeasing itself with preaching and social activism. It would be Qutbs leadership that would create both the militant aspect to the Brotherhoods message and lead to the organizations appearance as a threat to Nassers revolutionary government. Qutb himself was hanged by the Nasser administration as a ringleader of an alleged massive Brotherhood conspiracy against the government. The fledgling government would officially try to suppress the Brotherhood, arresting most of its known leaders, confiscating all printing materials, and banning the Brotherhood from public gathering, or political participation. By 1965, the Ikhwan al-Muslimiin would appear extinct.

    The Brotherhood, however, would rise again under the new Sadat administration. Sadat, who had sat on military tribunals that had condemned Muslim Brothers, took it upon himself to be the patron of rehabilitating the Muslim Brotherhood and fostering new Islamic organizations in Egypt. The reborn Brotherhood worked out a relationship with the new administration. The Brotherhood would not be allowed to regroup as a political party, but could continue to function publicly, publish newspapers and magazines, sponsor public speeches, and promote social welfare and financial institutions. Muslim Brothers forced underground by the Nasserist suppression began to emerge to help the reformation, the group again began to draw its numbers from the poor and middle classes. Financially the Brotherhood survived both on the membership of businessmen, doctors, engineers, and lawyers, but also on massive revenue sources outside Egypt, especially oil-rich countries like Iraq and Kuwait, and from patrons within the government of Saudi Arabia.

B. Al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya

    The Gamaat, or Islamic Groups, initially rose to popularity in Egypt during the 1960s. It was originally a student group on several different campuses in Egypt. The group espoused ideas similar to those of Hassan al-Banna, but more influenced by the Indian/Pakistani militant organization, Jamaat-i-Islami, started by Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi in 1941. As their message became more militant than the Brotherhood, the two organizations stopped communicating and went about their operations, often with the Gamaat accusing the Brotherhood of being an out of date tool of the government. Gamaat continues its recruiting policies today through local mosques, schools, and universities. Members of the Gamaat are actively sought by the government for arrest. There is little or no tolerance of this organization by Egyptian authorities.

    During the 1980s the Gamaat made a name for itself by recruiting young men to be trained to fight in the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Many of these numbers have returned to Egypt or elsewhere to use their training to further the cause of the organization. While there are many claims that these mujahaddin, or holy warriors, may have been trained by the American CIA while in Afghanistan, it is clear that their military knowledge is formidable and they should be taken seriously. Skeikh Omar Abd al-Rahman, the blind cleric convicted in the World Trade Center bombing, and his followers were members of a Gamaat cell operating out of Ismailiyya, Egypt after returning from the Afghan war. "The Gamaat has been blamed for more than 60% of the terrorist incidents in recent years, including assassinations, bombings, shootings, and most of the attacks against tourists and foreigners. Gamaat is most notable for its attacks on tourists, and blowing up coffee houses in tourist areas. In only some of these incidents has Gamaat actually claimed responsibility, generally by fax from Peshawar, Pakistan."⁶

C. Gamaat al-Jihad

    This organization is formed of former members of the Islamic Liberation Organization, which attempted a coup détat in 1974, by trying to capture Cairos Technical Military Academy. The coup, and its subsequent plan to assassinate Sadat and declare an Islamic state failed and most of the group was forced underground. "Members were drawn from the presidential guard, military intelligence, civil servants, radio and television workers, and university students and professors. In 1980 the different groups were brought together in a loosely organized movement governed by a consultative council."⁷ The writing of Mohammed al-Farag, The Neglected Obligation, was a combination of al-Banna, Mawdudi, and Qutb with all their ideas of revolutionary Islam taken seriously and the militant spirit of Qutbs message emphasized, as the guiding force to al-Jihad.

    This is also the organization that Lt. Khalid Islambuli would join, and eventually in whose name he would assassinate Anwar al-Sadat. al-Jihad considered that " The rulers of this age are in apostasy from Islam. They were raised at the tables of imperialism, be it Crusaderism, or Communism, or Zionism,"⁸ and as such it was a Muslims moral obligation to remove these apostates from power. Both al-Jihad and the Gamaat are the two most active militant Islamic movements in Egypt today. They both maintain their strength through the use of a network of educational and social welfare societies, such as Quran study groups, food shelters, clothing stations, and general social centers. They both receive additional help from student groups, such as books, clothes, tutoring, and housing.

    At the same time these are two of the most violent groups in Egypt. Since the death of Sadat, both al-Jihad and Gamaat have carried out military style campaigns against the government. Usually using the police as their targets, these groups attempt to slowly chip away at the foundation of the Mubarak regimes strength in an effort to bring about an Islamically ruled Egypt. Another way for these groups to attack the government is to target the highly valued tourist trade. By carrying out successful attacks against foreign visitors these organizations are able to tarnish Egypts image in the international community. If Egypt does not appear safe, tourists do not come. This dangerously logical tactic is a strong way to undermine the $3 billion tourist industry that Egypt has come to rely on.

After 1985 any reference to the al-Jihad organization should be considered to be the Jihad al-Jadiid (the New Jihad).

Modern Egypt and the Mubarak Regime

A. Stability

    Egypt, under both Sadat and Mubarak, has made noticeable progress in the areas of political and economic reform. Since the inception of Nassers single party, socialist government in 1954, Egypt has developed itself in an attempt to compete in the modern world. With the assistance of the former Soviet Union, and later the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Egypt has made strides towards addressing the very real problems of overpopulation, unemployment, and a faltering economy. The government also reports efforts in the areas of Human Rights, an area in which Egypt has a very poor record. Several of these policies and reforms deserve special attention here.

    In an attempt to continue strengthening the legitimacy of his regime, Anwar Sadat enacted several political reforms that had particular effect in regards to the common mans role in government. The Arab Socialist Union, the sole political party developed under the Nasser regime, controlled Egypts political landscape, but was often charged with being the party of the elite and privileged. In attempt to assuage popular pressure, in 1974 Sadat called for the reform of the Union and the Egyptian political system. These reforms were geared to address various social forces in society as well as expanding the forum to new political parties. In 1976 Sadat approved the creation of three parties, including a renewed Socialist Union. The regime continued its strength under Egypts Arab Socialist party, against the centrist Liberal Socialist party, and the left wing Progressive Unionist party. In the election of the same year the Arab Socialist party was elected to a overwhelming majority in parliament.

    In 1978 Sadat would again expand political representation, with the creation of his own National Democratic Party (NDP) and the New Wafd party, a recreation of a favored pre-revolution political party. The NDP immediately became the majority party when members of the Arab Socialist party joined and voted to dissolve their former party. That same year Sadat was instrumental in the development of the Socialist Labor Party, a direct challenger to the constituency of the Unionist party.

    Sadats final addition to Egypts political landscape would be the 1980 amendments to the Permanent Constitution. Among these changes were; the altering of the clause regarding Islamic Jurisprudence, instead of the principal source of legislation it was to become the sole source of Egyptian law. The Arab Socialist Union was officially dissolved and the declaration of multi-party elections was drafted. Socialist style references to the elimination of class differences were removed in favor of protection of legitimate earnings and a guarantee of equal distribution of public duties and responsibilities. In response to the parliament electing Sadat "president for life" the clause mandating only two terms was altered to mention an indefinite term limit. Finally a new section was added to the constitution, one half relating to the formation of the Shura, or consultation, council, while the second half called for the creation of the Supreme Press Council as a media watchdog in the Egyptian press.

    "Through the 1980s, President Hosni Mubaraks government had managed to balance, with some degree of success, the needs of stability and reform. By carefully opening the political arena to an array of parties and allowing the press greater freedom to criticize government policies as well as individual members of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), the regime acquired a valuable measure of legitimacy."⁹ Upon his succession from Sadat, Mubarak released a number of political prisoners and offered rehabilitation systems for those charged with more serious offenses. The new president announced his interest and respect for all forms of legitimate opposition and his willingness to hold open discussions with members of such opposition. The Wafd party emerged yet again, and the new Ummah party was created in 1983 as the sanctioned Islamically oriented party.

    Along with this new party, certain restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood were again lifted during the 1980s. The Ikhwan , and other independent Islamists, were allowed to participate in elections by allying themselves with other parties. Thus, the Brotherhood ran under the umbrella of the New Wafd party in 1984, and with the Socialist Labor party in 1987. The regime also began to tolerate Islamist dominance in areas such as professional associations, as during the 1980s Islamists controlled the University Teachers Clubs, and were gaining strength in the fields of medicine, the press, and legal syndicates.

    In the economic field, Egypt has not been as successful as hoped for. The Mubarak regime has maintained the basic tenets of Infitah, but Cairo is now feeling more foreign pressure than existed under Sadat. The regime has managed to lower inflation rates to under 10 percent per year, improve on the budget deficit, foreign balance of payments, and the stability of the Egyptian pound again foreign currency, most notably the US dollar. But, the US and the IMF are both pressuring Egypt to increase the success stories while continuing reform in the system itself. Threats of withholding aid and loans have seemed to motivate the Mubarak regime in recent years.

B. Instability

    Even as the Mubarak regime tries to impress foreign investors with its reform record, the seeds of dissent are growing in Egyptian society. It seems that for every success the Egyptian government lauds, there is either a downside or negative result in the making. Until his death in 1981, Anwar Sadat had tried to make himself the center of reform in Egypt. His experiments in the multiparty system, though still existing today, were not always successful. Along with his reforms to allow political opposition groups came laws restricting those groups, such as the laws of value protection and social peace which so hindered the free association of political parties that the New Wafd dissolved itself in 1978, and the Unionist party suspended all public activities and the printing of its newspaper. Thus, during elections just prior to his assassination, Sadat had ordered the breaking into of opposition party headquarters, been responsible for censoring the opposition press, and ordering the arrest of 1500 members of different opposition groups from all along the political spectrum.

    It is policies and results formulated under the Sadat administration that have challenged the successive Mubarak regime to adapt to the past and gain knowledge towards its own era of governing and reform. This new era has been characterized by periods of violent instability in the population. As both the government and its opposition struggle for legitimacy and power, it has been the civilian population and perhaps the future of the country that have suffered the most damage. Opposition to government policies comes from various elements of the population and reflects on every aspect of the governments management of the nation, society, politics, and the economy. While many groups marginalize themselves to protesting the government and struggling to make a difference, there are those who feel that only violence and terror will end the governments reign. Both sides of the argument are worthy of attention.

1. The Economy

    "The riots seemed to vindicate the few leftist politicians and disgruntled intellectuals who had stopped to examine the negative implications of Sadats economic liberalization. These malcontents argued correctly that relatively few Egyptians were actually going to benefit from the new commercial enterprises. This opening of the economy was creating a new class of rich opportunists and their spoiled children who were able to buy the luxury goods that were flooding the stores and to purchase the new apartments that were being built. The rest of the country, long accustomed to the "share the poverty" egalitarianism of the Nasser era looked on with envy and resentment. The growing disparity between the relatively few "have" and the legions of "have nots" led inevitably to the political disillusionment that haunts the country a decade later"¹⁰

    The statement above is just the beginning of public resentment towards Egypts economic standing. "The economic disintegration that has continued since 1985 is the primary reason behind Egypts current domestic instability... arguably manifestations of severe economic dislocation : inflation, unemployment, overpopulation, inadequacy of transportation, housing, education, and health services."¹¹ Giving in to pressures from the IMF, the World Bank and USAID, the Egyptian government has begun lifting its policies of general subsidies. While at the same time government wages are static, but the cost of living increases without subsidy, in effect driving real wages also downward. The government is trying to reduce its role in providing education and health care, effectively privatizing these fields, and driving prices up. Thus, as real wage rates continue to drop the demand for social service programs will rise, and remain largely unmet by the government.

    This is the cycle that fuels the rise in public unrest and eventually to the rise in anti-government violence. While a large percentage of the population cannot afford higher education and do not have jobs available without it, they experience the discontent that many radical groups feed on. Preying on the young for their naiveté, many organizations use the anger felt in society and attempt to refocus it as violent acts against the government. Whether from a sense of hopelessness or the promise of rewards for their families, many young men fall victim to this process and often find themselves in jail simply for associating with certain people. "Authoritarian politics of exclusion limits the outlets of expression of dissatisfaction, anger, and frustration. In these circumstances, the growing popularity of Islamic groups (such as the Gamaat al-Islamiyya) is understandable."¹²

2. The State and Society

    " [T]he popularity of these, as well as the non-political, non-militant, groups is due to their ability to see the problems of ordinary Egyptians, mobilize resources, and help solve many such problems (health care, education, job training, etc.). And even when they cannot actually solve some problems (e.g. unemployment), the fact that they are trying tells the ordinary Egyptian that these people, from their own communities, at least care and that the government, its corrupt and lazy bureaucracy, and especially its powerful and effective security forces do not care, are not trying to help, and are in fact making matters worse."¹³ This is the role many "terrorist" organizations maintain in Egypt today. They are truly social services and welfare associations, trying to help their citizens where the government either cant or simply does not. The greatest example of this was during the 1992 Earthquake in Cairo. 550 people were killed, 10,000 injured, and thousands more left with no place to live. Within hours of the incident the Gamaat al-Islamiyya and other Islamic groups were busy providing housing, food, and clothing to the victims. Some reports state that after one week certain areas affected by the devastation had still not been visited by government representatives.

    Incidents like these are clear examples of how these organizations often operate. But, the government usually takes such opportunities to crack down on groups. In the weeks immediately following the earthquake the number of violent attacks against government personnel, and foreigners increased sharply. At the same time State Security officers were sweeping through the poorer areas of Cairo cracking down on any Islamist activity. "[T]his may very well have been a government act of "jealousy," an effort to demonstrate that even if Islamists can provide for peoples immediate and other needs, even if the government is inefficient in providing relief and other support, the government is still in charge, is still more powerful than any group or any combination of groups."¹⁴

    Can the regime survive if it is so out of touch with its citizenry? The Mubarak administration apparently thinks so, as it continues to crack down on Islamist organizations, who may very well have more popular support than the president. The government tries to maintain control over these groups, but they emerge from all walks of life. There are Islamic and Christian charitable organizations, feminist groups, and student groups, each addressing their own constituency, but also society at large.

3. Political Legitimacy

    The question of the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime is one that is constantly asked by radical Islamist campaigns. Many organizations refuse to recognize the Free Officer Revolution, therefore, the regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak are meaningless. In contrast, forty-five years of survival is proof enough for most people, and thus a moot point on which to challenge the government. These groups, however, do attack legitimacy, but with political skill and often popular agreement. "The educational and religious backgrounds of many militants remind us that, however repugnant the acts of extremism might be, they were not mindless or irrational. Specific causes motivated their actions: food riots in 1977 in Cairo, unemployment, acute housing shortages, poverty, Sadats open-door (al-infitah) economic program, the Camp David Accords with Israel."¹⁵ Some Islamist organizations trace their lack of faith in government back to Sadats 1979 calling for the separation of religion and politics, the ultimate affront to Muslim organizations struggling to establish an Islamic state. This coupled with Sadats decision to nationalize several hundred mosques in an attempt to control their patrons was enough to condemn Sadats administration. Along with these, Sadat did not focus on the anti-imperialist aspects that Nasser used. Instead he often emphasized the Islamic community and common interests of Muslim states, as well as the commonality of interests between the Islamic states and the West. Like the Shah of Iran, Sadats use of pro-Western orientations against the Soviet threat undermined his legitimacy with his people and further alienated Islamic groups.

    While the legitimacy of the current Mubarak regime continues, it is often manifested mainly as apathy amongst the people. The Muslim Brotherhood is commonly seen as the best, most viable source of opposition. The regimes persistent refusal to pursue true democratic reforms has frustrated and alienated much of the population, as evidenced by the 27% voter registration numbers. The official stance of the Muslim Brotherhood is stated as: " Despite the fact that the people are on the whole Muslims, and that the number of non-Muslims in these societies is always a minority, the Shariah [(Islamic Law)] has been pushed aside since the beginning of this century by invading crusaders and other enemies of Islam and that these nations were ruled with laws that draw no references to the law of Allah. Now, the responsibility of re-establishing a true Islamic system lays in the hands of both the ruler and the ruled, but primarily in the rulers hands."¹⁶

    However, even simpler than organizational platforms are, what many would consider, hard facts. Opposition parties often point to election results as the ultimate "foul" on the behalf of the government and its ruling NDP. In the 1992 election the NDP was able to win 4,602 slates, while the Islamic Alliance of the Socialist Labor Party and the still outlawed Muslim Brotherhood were able to capture 71 slates, and the New Wafd party was able to manage 144 slates. Many groups cried foul, pointing to professional organization where others, especially Islamists, are able to win majorities against government favored candidates. These professions, medicine, engineering, pharmacy, and science syndicates are almost entirely controlled by Muslim Brothers. Both sides have called for international, or impartial monitoring of elections, however these monitors often run into problems on election days, usually being told that they are interfering with Egypts sovereignty.

C. Middle Ground?

"The Egyptian State is not going to be overthrown. We always write its obituary, but it has been around for a long time and it is really in the saddle." ¹⁷

-Fouad Ajami, Professor Middle East History

"American Intelligence analysts believe that President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt is in grave danger of being overthrown by Islamic fundamentalists."¹⁸

-Denis J. Sullivan, Professor Middle East History

    In 1991 the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won a majority of seats in the Algerian parliament. To prevent the Islamic party from coming to power a coup ensued during which martial law was declared and the election results declared void. This act started a wave of violence in Algeria, that has spread as far as France. Prior to popular elections in 1997 the clashes between FIS, the Algerian government and other radical groups had claimed upwards of 60,000 lives. This event has given rise to a concept known as the "Algeria Syndrome." Is Egypt on the path towards being the next Algeria? Will martial law be declared in Cairo? Will the Gamaat or al-Jihad succeed in their mission to destroy Egypts secular government? Anti-government violence has slowed in Egypt lately, with only minor flare ups now and again. But, all opposition parties are working round the clock to try and undermine the power of the NDP. Meanwhile, the government continues to strike out at groups it perceives as terrorists, and those groups tend to strike back.

    The Muslim Brotherhood has come out with its own statements regarding the direction and state of Egyptian government today. The Brotherhood had repeatedly restated its non-violent message, calling on both sides to stop violent actions which are a "violation of Shariah." "History has shown that violence does not bring down a regime. There are always alternative elite in every country ready and willing to take over and implement the same policies again."¹⁹ Is the government willing to accept to message of a non-violent Islamic group? Is the Brotherhood ready to work with the regime again?

    Possibilities point towards the importation of terror against the government and the population. Will Iran, the Sudan, or Pakistan export some of their own problems to Egypt? Will the United States and Egypts other western allies be able to defend it and still support the nation? "...[T]he Mubarak government, whether by default or by design, has subordinated its commitment to reform to its quest to suppress all Islamists. By treating the Islamists as a security threat instead of as a political challenge, the regime seems to be losing its ability to shape events and to forge a consensus over social and economic policies."²⁰

    The best suggestion for the Mubarak regime could be to uphold the law, and provide protection against violence and intimidation. The regime must keep a very watchful eye on which direction it wishes to take democracy, before it ends up isolated and ignored like the Sadat administration of the 1970s. Foreign influence in reform should also be cut back. Egypt stands at the crossroads of either economic ruin or a period of prolonged stability and growth. These cutbacks should not allow the Egyptian government to slip into a period of complacency. Egypts allies need to continue to promote economic and political well being, combined, hopefully, with a relaxation of military activity and an improved human rights record in the future.

This piece was written by , President, Middle East Information Network.
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